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Abstract 
 
Experience goods are characterized by information asymmetry and a lack of ex ante 
knowledge of product quality, such that reliable external signals of quality are likely to be 
highly valued. Two potentially credible sources of such information are reviews from 
professional critics and ‘word-of-mouth’ from other consumers. This paper makes a direct 
comparison between the relative influences and interactions of reviews from both of these 
sources on the sales performance of video games software. In order to empirically estimate 
and separate the effects of the two signals, we analyze a sample of 1,480 video games and 
their sales figures between 2004 and 2010. We find evidence to suggest that, even after taking 
steps to control for endogeneity, reviews from professional critics have a significantly 
positive influence on sales which outweighs that from consumer reviews. We also find 
evidence to suggest that reviews from professional critics also interact significantly with other 
signals of product quality.  Consequently, we contend that professional critics adopt the role 
of an influencer, whereas word-of-mouth opinion acts more as a predictor of sales in the 
market for video games. 
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How do reviews from professional critics interact with other signals of product 
quality? Evidence from the video game industry 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Experience goods are characterized by a lack of a priori knowledge of product quality, leading to 
information asymmetry between consumers and producers (Nelson 1970). An effective means by which 
to reduce this asymmetry is the transmission of credible signals of quality to the consumer. Whereas the 
traditional signaling model1 involves the transmission of signals from agents directly to principals, it may 
be that signals originating from external third-parties have a stronger and more reliable status than the 
signals of producers due to the independence of the source. In the context of entertainment markets, there 
exists a well-developed body of literature on the effect of signaling on sales performance, particularly with 
respect to the motion picture industry. Such studies typically find a positive correlation between film 
reviews and box office returns as a result of reduced information asymmetry (Basuroy et al., 2003; 
Boatwright et al., 2007). However, despite a growing body of evidence suggesting that these external signals 
might influence buyer behavior when considered separately, few authors have previously attempted to 
simultaneously analyze the influence of these two signals on sales performance, nor any possible 
interaction between these two signals; especially in contexts outside of the movie industry.   
 
In this study, we focus on the relationship between commercial performance and two observable signals 
of product quality; reviews from professional critics and online word-of-mouth. In the case of the latter, 
we use online consumer reviews as a proxy; an approach with is consistent with other studies by Wien and 
Olsen (2012) and Racherla et al. (2012). The analysis of consumer behavior and sales performance in the 
video game industry we undertake in this study makes a unique contribution to the literature by offering 
a direct comparison between the relative influences of consumer word-of-mouth with reviews from 
professional critics. Such a comparison is potentially valuable given the prevailing view that word-of-
                                                 
1Signaling theory was firstly introduced by Michael Spence in his seminal 1973 article about the reduction of asymmetry information in the selection of 
potential job candidates. In the Spence model, candidates’ education levels serve as a signal of the quality of future employees. Potential employers 
interpret the education signal and adjust their selection behavior in response to the education levels by offering a better job proposal than if they had not 
been given the signal by the candidates. 
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mouth and other content generated by users is becoming an increasingly influential factor in consumer 
decision making; possibly even to the exclusion of traditional reliance on the opinions of experts or 
professional critics (Holbrook & Addis, 2007; Bughin et al., 2010). Our analysis explicitly considers the 
possibility that these signals affect consumer behavior both jointly and separately through undertaking a 
more detailed examination of interactions between signals and the subsequent effect on sales performance. 
Accordingly, the paper aims to address the following specific research questions: 
 
(i) How do signals of quality from professional critics influence buyer behavior compared with consumer 
word-of-mouth? 
 
(ii) How do these signals interact; both with each other and with a range of alternative indicators of 
product quality? 
 
Our extensive empirical analysis shows that when reviews from professional critics and consumer word-
of-mouth are controlled for simultaneously, the valence of consumer word-of-mouth does not 
significantly affect sales performance. Instead, we find evidence of a significant relationship with respect 
to reviews from professional critics even after taking steps to control for endogeneity through the use of 
a GMM estimation. We also demonstrate the importance of interaction between reviews from professional 
critics and other external signals of product quality that might influence consumer behavior. Our study is 
the first to apply such techniques in the context of the market for video games and builds on a mounting 
recognition of the need to control for reviews from both professional critics and consumer word-of-
mouth when modelling sales performance (Basuroy et al., 2014) 
 
The following section presents background information on the video games industry, an entertainment 
market has received significantly less attention in the academic literature compared to the movie industry. 
This is followed by a section where we outline our research hypotheses and subsequently move on to 
provide a description of our data. Finally, we present our empirical results, followed by a discussion of the 
findings and managerial implications. 
 
2. The video games market 
 
From its origins in the 1970s up to its meteoric rise in significance and profitability during the last decade, 
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the home video gaming market has traditionally involved competition between firms under conditions of 
classic oligopoly. The high fixed and low marginal costs of production as well as strong network 
externalities has led to a series of fierce contests between hardware manufacturers to establish dominant 
platforms. Well-known examples include Atari and Mattel’s battle during the 1980s, superseded by the 
rivalry between Nintendo and Sega in the early 1990s and Microsoft and Sony in the early 2000s. As a 
consequence, the competition to develop recognizable software franchises and ‘killer apps’ that sell 
hardware units and build a strong installed user base has led to the establishment of established gaming 
franchises such as Mario, Grand Theft Auto and Call of Duty; many of which have become cultural icons 
appealing to a wider range of consumers. Indeed, while gaming may originally have been seen to be the 
exclusive preserve of children and teenagers, the market has evolved and matured along with its original 
consumers while continuing to welcome a succession of new generations and demographics. According 
to the Entertainment Software Association (2012), the average gamer in the US is now thirty years of age, 
while forty-seven per cent of gamers are female. In fact, adult female gamers now represent around twice 
the proportion of gamers made up by boys aged seventeen or younger. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 illustrates both the upward trend and cyclical performance of the US video games market from 
1995 to the present day, measured in terms of hardware and software sales revenues. In 2012, it can be 
seen that the market was valued at around $15bn annually. Historically, there is a clear pattern of significant 
growth during and immediately following years where new hardware models are launched, followed by 
flattening or declining performance in subsequent years. For reference, the significant years where this 
occurred are 1995/6 (release of the Sony Playstation and Nintendo 64), 2000/01 (release of Playstation 2, 
Nintendo Gamecube and Microsoft Xbox) and 2005/06 (release of the Microsoft Xbox 360, Nintendo 
Wii and Sony Playstation 3). Despite the huge successes observed over the last decade, the market 
experienced a relative decline from 2008 to 2012, possibly due to a combination of weak economic 
conditions, the rise in popularity of gaming on mobile phones and tablets and the approach of the end of 
the generational cycle. The decline in sales have resulted in some recent high-profile casualties, most 
notably the demise of major games publisher THQ. 
 
Due to high development costs and uncertain market demand, it is vitally important for video games 
developers and publishers to be able to forecast product sales efficiently, in particular those of new 
products at the beginning of their product life cycles. Thus, it is essential to understand the signals that are 
  
4 
 
 
 
relevant to the purchase decision and how the information contained in these signals can be measured and 
evaluated in order to optimize managerial decisions and strengthen competitive advantages. However, 
despite this obvious need for research into the behavior of video games consumers, only a very limited 
number of studies investigate the relationship between external signals of quality and sales performance 
in this particular market context. Of those which do, Cox (2014) finds that reviews from professional 
critics are an important determinant of sales performance, while Zhu and Zhang (2010) show that online 
reviews are more influential for less popular games and for those consumers that are more experienced in 
their use of the internet. However, there generally remains a shortage of empirical studies of sales 
performance in the market for video games, especially when compared with other entertainment goods 
such as motion pictures. Our study at least partly addresses this shortfall.  
 
The following section outlines the variety of signals that are likely to influence consumer behavior in the 
market for video games software, based both on signaling theory and empirical evidence from the related 
literature.  Through due consideration of the nature of these signals, we develop a number of explicit 
research hypotheses that form the basis of the empirical investigation presented later in this paper. 
3. Research hypotheses 
 
The influence of individual signals 
A number of studies have estimated the impact of reviews on the sales performance of entertainment 
goods; both from professional critics (Prag and Casvant, 1994; Gemser et al., 2007; Basuroy and Chaterjee, 
2008; Terry et al., 2011; Hennig-Thurau et al., 2012) and consumer word-of-mouth (Dellarocas, 2003; 
Godes and Mayzlin, 2004; Senecal and Nantel, 2004; Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas et al., 2007; 
Chen and Xie, 2008; Archak et al., 2011; Cui et al. 2012). However, a major limitation of many of these 
studies is that they tend to control for only one of these types of product review, even though Chintagunta 
et al. (2010) has highlighted the potentially significant differences between reviews from professional critics 
and users; such as reviews from professional critics being quotable in marketing and promotional material 
(Basuroy et al. 2011). If this is indeed the case, it would be valuable and perhaps even necessary to control 
for both sources of information in order to compare and contrast any influence on consumer behavior. 
 
Additionally, while a majority of studies highlight the significance of the valence of online reviews upon 
sales performance, a selection of others have investigated a number of different aspects of online reviews 
besides the raw assessment of product quality. For example, Duan et al. (2008) find that it is actually the 
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volume of consumer reviews that associates more strongly with commercial performance compared to 
other measures, while Clemons et al. (2006) find that it is the consistency of online ratings which offers 
the most significant predictor of sales growth among the craft beer industry. Other studies (e.g. Liu, 2006 
and Schindler and Bickart, 2012) examine the length of reviews and find these to be positively correlated 
to perceived value. 
 
Based on the findings of these studies, we contend that independent information expressed in product 
reviews has three plausible ways in which it can influence consumer behavior. First, more positive 
evaluations lower uncertainty over product quality among prospective consumers. Second, if evaluations 
reach near unanimity in opinion, then customers’ certainty in their purchase decision will increase. Third, 
the more reviews have been submitted, the lower is the evaluation insecurity among future buyers. 
Consequently, we formulate the following research hypothesis referring to professional critics and 
consumer word-of-mouth: 
 
H1: The valence, volume and consistency of product reviews from both professional 
critics and consumer word-of-mouth will have a positive significant effect on total 
sales. 
 
The interaction of signals 
A majority of studies of the entertainment industry typically concentrate on the separate evaluation of 
distinct types of signals as part of a multiple regression analysis. However, it is likely in reality that 
consumers assess credibility and reliability of the interaction of distinct types and similar types of signals 
jointly. Although there is a shortage of studies in marketing on the interaction of signals, the economics 
literature has produced a number of studies on the value of multiple signals of product quality, most 
notably in relation to the moral hazard associated with agency theory (Hölmstrom, 1979) and most often 
considered in relation to issues of corporate governance and performance-related pay (Fama, 1980; Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011).  However, it is also possible that the effect of additional 
signals diminishes at the margin as the total number of available signals increases. In the specific context 
of entertainment markets, Basuroy et al. (2006) are one of the first to empirically study interaction between 
signals of quality. Using movie business industry data and a dynamic simultaneous-equations model, they 
show that the interaction of greater advertising expenditures and sequels has a significant positive 
interaction effect on box office revenues. Other authors such as Kirmani and Rao (2000) and Dhar et al. 
(2012) also account for interaction between limited numbers and types of independent signals in their 
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theoretical framework. Building on this work and the principles of signaling theory, we consider the 
importance of additional signals and their interactions and propose the following additional research 
hypotheses: 
 
H2: The interaction between reviews from professional critics and consumer 
word-of-mouth and will positively affect total sales. 
 
H3: The interaction between product reviews and a range of additional 
observable signals of product quality (sequels, re-releases, mature age rating) 
will positively affect total sales. 
 
Thus, H2 allows us to test the extent to which reviews from professional critics interact with word-of-
mouth and whether consumers ultimately place a higher value on unanimity between the two sources of 
information. Correspondingly, H3 allows us to test the extent to which a number of signals of product 
quality are interpreted individually or jointly by consumers in this particular market context. 
 
4. Data and Method 
 
In order to empirically verify the influence of critic reviews on market success, we construct a sample 
consisting of 1,304 video games and their commercial performance between 2004 and 2010. Sales figures 
are obtained from VGChartz, while other characteristics (genre, age rating etc.) are obtained from the 
MobyGames database. We concentrate our analysis on the five mainstream console and handheld devices 
available during this period: Nintendo DS, Nintendo Wii, Sony PlayStation 3, Sony PSP and Xbox 360. 
Product reviews are obtained from Metacritic, a website that reviews music, movies, TV shows and 
especially video games on the basis of a weighted average of mainstream critical responses. Metacritic is 
widely acknowledged and highly regarded source of review information among consumers and within the 
industry itself, with video game publishers even beginning to be explicitly refer to the site in their contracts 
with development studios and imposing penalties if a title is reviewed poorly (Wingfield, 2007). We record 
the reported ‘metascores’ from professional critics, as well as those from consumer reviews as a proxy for 
online word-of-mouth. The approach of using online reviews as a proxy in this way is consistent with a 
number of prior studies of cinema box office performance using reviews from Yahoo Movies (Liu, 2006; 
Chintagunta et al., 2010) and IMDb (Roschk & Große, 2013) for such purposes.  Indeed, very recent 
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studies, such as Hennig-Thurau et al. (2014), have even begun to use comments shared using 
microblogging sites such as Twitter as a proxy for consumer word-of-mouth in a similar way.  
 
A summary of key descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis can be found in Table 
1. As stated in our hypothesis section, we test the effect of three different factors relating to reviews to 
model the influence of both professional critics and word-of-mouth on sales performance; valence, volume 
and consistency. Valence represents a comparable measure of weighted average review scores from 
professional critics and consumers2. According to the data in Table 1 valence levels appear to be relatively 
similar for both groups, with individual titles achieving an average review score of approximately 70/100. 
In addition, we also measure the volume or total number of reviews posted on Metacritic, with the 
expectation that greater numbers of total reviews lead to reduced levels of uncertainty among consumers. 
On average, consumers generate more than twice the quantity of individual reviews compared to 
professional critics, with an average of around 38 critic reviews per title versus an average of around 95 
reviews posted by consumers.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The final aspect of reviews we measure in this study is the consistency of ratings awarded by critics and users. 
Alongside the overall scores awarded, Metacritic also reports the numbers of positive, mixed and negative 
reviews posted for each title. We postulate that higher levels of inconsistency will lead to greater 
uncertainty of product quality among consumers, while near-unanimous verdicts will lead to reductions in 
uncertainty. Our measure of consistency is the sum of squares of the proportions of positive, negative, and 
mixed opinions among the total number of reviews. Accordingly, the consistency variable is somewhat 
analogous to the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, which captures the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity 
of any variable of interest (usually market concentration). Our consistency variable is therefore bounded 
between an upper value of 1 (perfect consistency) and a lower value of 0.33 (exactly equal proportions of 
reviews in each of the three opinion categories). By way of offering an additional insight into the 
consistency of product reviews, Figure 2 presents Lorenz curves for both consistency measures and shows 
that word-of-mouth reviews tend to demonstrate greater unanimity compared to those of professional 
critics; a condition that is also verified by the means of our measure of consistency (0.65 for professional 
                                                 
2 Metacritic measures user valence on scale ranging from 0-10 (with decimals), while scores from professional critics are measured on a scale ranging 
from 0-100 (without decimals).  In order to allow for direct comparability between the two measures, we simply rescale the user scores to make them 
directly comparable to scores from professional critics by multiplying through by a factor of 10. 
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critics and 0.69 for word-of-mouth). Nonetheless, both curves are fairly close to the 45° line, which 
suggests that there generally tends to be a high level of unanimity in the review of video games from both 
sources. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Owing to the use of similar variables capturing online reviews from both professional critics and users, we 
present correlation coefficients between these variables in Table 2 below. The highest level of correlation 
can be observed between the valence of users and professional critics, with a coefficient of +0.63. 
Although this relatively high correlation is potentially a cause for concern, the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) scores reported later in our regression analysis show that the inclusion of both user and professional 
critic valence in the same model specification leads to an acceptable level of inflation of the coefficient 
estimates compared to a situation where there is no linear relationship between predictor variables. The 
highest VIF values in any of our regression specifications do not exceed a value of 7 and are well below 
the threshold whereby multicollinarity would significantly affect our results.  Nonetheless, we use only 
centered values for all of our measures of professional critic response and word-of mouth in order to 
minimize multicollinarity once interaction terms are introduced into the model. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In addition to the above, we also include a number of additional signals of product quality, such as dummy 
variables indicating whether the title is a sequel or re-release, reflecting reputation effects and prior market 
success for a particular franchise. Rereleases account for around 6% and sequels around 56% of the titles 
in our sample.  In particular, it should be noted that this represents a significantly larger proportion of 
sequels than is typically seen in studies of other cultural and creative industries such as Basuroy et al. (2006). 
Additionally, as per DeVany and Walls (2002) and Ravid (1999), we utilize an age-classification variable by 
including the variable Rating M (mature age rating) in our analysis, which applies to around 18% of the 
titles in our sample. Besides testing for the influence of critics and additional signaling effects, we also 
control for gameplay characteristics, release information and other available ex ante indicators of quality, 
publisher size and market share. Our list of control variables is consistent with those used in similar studies 
of the movie industry, such as Litman (1983), Sochay (1994) and Elberse and Eliashberg (2003). We also 
control for genre and group effects, as well as miscellaneous industry and time (life-cycle) effects through 
the inclusion of a linear trend measuring the length of time in years between the release of each individual 
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title and the relevant hardware platform. The full list of model variables included in the regression 
explaining sales performance for title i is therefore; 
 
ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛾2𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝜌1(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 × 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖)
+ 𝜃1(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖  × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖)  + 𝜃2(𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖  × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖)
+ 𝜎1𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜂1𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜂2𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑖
+ 𝜂3𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 +  𝜂4𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
+ 𝜂5𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(1) 
 
Where the definitions of each of these individual or vectors of variables are consistent with the categories 
of variables reported in Table 1. In particular, note that the ‘Other Signals’ vector consists of controls for 
whether title i is a sequel, re-release or has a mature age rating, while the ‘Game Specific Controls’ vector 
consists of controls for time (life cycle), maximum number of players supported, online functionality, 
licensed franchise, coming packaged with an accessory and availability on other hardware platforms.  
Specifically, the values of the 𝛽 and 𝛾 coefficients allow us to test hypothesis H1, the 𝜌 coefficient allows 
for the testing of H2 and the 𝜃 coefficients allow for the testing of H3. The following section presents the 
results of this and a series of alternate model specifications as a robustness check and as a means by which 
to explore a range of different interactions of signals both separately and jointly. 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 3 summarizes the estimations of the relationship between sales and reviews from professional critics 
and users. Regression output from seven different model specifications are presented including a variety 
of combinations of explanatory variables outlined in the full model outlined above in Equation (1). Models 
I-III estimate the relationship between sales and a range of alternative combinations of critical and word-
of-mouth response, thereby directly testing hypotheses H1. Model IV includes a variable to measure 
interaction between professional critic and user valence, which allows for the testing of hypothesis H2. 
Finally, models V-VII include additional interaction terms to capture the interrelationships between 
valence and a range of other external signals of product quality, which allows for the testing of H3. The 
regression output is remarkably consistent between model specifications, indicating that our findings are 
broadly robust. However, some important distinctions can be made, most notably between the 
specifications that do and do not include the various combinations of interaction terms. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
Focusing on the model specifications that do not include interaction terms (I-III), it is apparent that every 
measure of professional critical response (valence, volume and consistency) associates positively and 
significantly with sales. A one unit increase in valence, which is equivalent to a 1% increase in the review 
score, is found to associate with an increase in unit sales of around 1.5% on average. Comparatively, each 
additional review from a professional critic associates with an average increase in sales of around 1.6%, 
while a one unit increase in the consistency of reviews posted by professional critic’s associates with an 
average increase in unit sales of around 113%3. When taken in isolation, the equivalent independent 
variables representing the response of word-of-mouth look relatively similar. A one unit increase in the 
average word-of-mouth review increases unit sales by around 1.4%, while the association with volume of 
word-of-mouth reviews is around 0.1% increase in sales for each additional review. This indicates that the 
marginal impact of an additional review from professional critics is significantly greater than that of a 
single additional user review, such that volume of critic reviews seems to be a more important determinant 
of sales performance than the volume of consumer reviews.  
 
Perhaps contrary to expectations, a statistically significant negative relationship is observed between the 
consistency of word-of-mouth reviews and unit sales, with an elasticity of approximately -0.54. As we also 
see this negative association demonstrated via the negative correlation coefficient reported in Table 2, the 
only reasonable interpretation for this finding is that a lack of consistency in consumer word-of-mouth 
does not seem to have a limiting effect on product sales. In fact, this result may simply suggest that 
consumers tend to be more consistent in their assessment of poorly selling games, whereas successful titles 
tend to split consumer opinion to a greater extent. Broadly speaking, this may suggest that consumers tend 
to act as predictors rather than influencers in this particular market context. It is also worth noting that 
these coefficient estimates for volume and consistency of ratings from both professional critics and 
consumer word-of-mouth remain consistent across all of the model specifications that we subsequently 
present, leading us to conclude that these findings are considerably robust. 
 
When the reviews from professional critics and word-of-mouth reviews are considered together in model 
III, a somewhat different pattern emerges to that presented above. The estimated elasticity of sales with 
respect to the valence of professional critic reviews is relatively unchanged, while the elasticity of sales to 
                                                 
3 As this variable is bounded between 0-1 the ‘elasticity’ is best regarded as approximately +1.13. 
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word-of-mouth reviews is found to be statistically equivalent to zero. These results suggest that the 
influence of professional critical response on sales dominates that of word-of-mouth if both are controlled 
for simultaneously, while coefficient estimates reflecting the relationship between sales and the volume 
and consistency of reviews from both users and professional critics do not dramatically change. Overall, 
these findings offer limited support for hypothesis H1, given that unit sales are found to be relatively elastic 
to all measures of professional critical response and both the volume and consistency of word-of-mouth. 
However, as the effect of user valence becomes statistically equivalent to zero once critic valence is 
controlled for, we conclude that word-of-mouth does not seem to associate with any significant variation 
in commercial performance. This finding is further reinforced by the results from model specification IV, 
where an additional term is included to capture the interaction between the valence of professional critics 
and users, which also shows that the coefficient attached to professional critic valence remains positive 
and significant. By contrast, the estimated coefficients for valence of users and the interaction term are 
both statistically indistinguishable from zero, leading us to reject hypothesis H2. This essentially suggests 
that it is the opinion of professional critics that dominates the valence of users when explaining variation 
in sales; user valence is found to have no significant relationship either when controlled for independently 
or in interaction with the opinions of professional critics. 
 
It should also be noted that in all of our model specifications, the effect of two other credible ex ante 
signals of quality (whether the respective title is a sequel and/or a re-release) are found to significantly 
increase unit sales, with the average of the coefficient estimates suggesting average increases in unit sales 
of around 23% and 25% respectively. This indicates that familiarity with an existing franchise acts as a 
strong signal of product quality that influences buyer behavior. The final quality signal we use (an ‘M’ or 
‘Mature’ age rating) is not found to significantly affect unit sales in these specifications. It is also important 
to highlight that our control for original selling price leads to a positive and statistically significant estimate 
of the price-elasticity of demand. Although the relationship between price and sales is found to be relatively 
inelastic (estimates place the elasticity between +0.24 and +0.39), the consistently positive sign obviously 
contradicts theoretical expectations. It is possible that price is correlated with some other unobserved 
variable such as the anticipated duration or depth of gameplay experience, or that price itself is regarded 
as a credible signal of quality in this market context. Alternatively, it may simply be that video game 
publishers price titles in accordance with anticipated demand; consumers are simply willing to pay higher 
prices for ‘blockbuster’ titles. Whatever the cause, we do not suggest that demand for video games 
increases with price ceteris paribus, but instead highlight the coefficient estimates as potentially signifying 
the issues of omitted variable bias and/or endogeneity that we are unable to account for in the regression 
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framework without additional instruments.   
 
Models VI and VII include interaction terms which capture the interrelationship between both critic and 
word-of-mouth valence and other signals of quality available to buyers, which allow for the formal testing 
of hypothesis H3. We find evidence to suggest that some degree of interaction is important in explaining 
variations in sales performance, especially between the valence of professional critics and a mature age 
rating. The signs and relative magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that opinions of professional critics 
associate more strongly with sales performance for games with a mature rating.  Mature titles that are 
suggested to be of poor quality sell significantly fewer units on average, while mature titles which are 
suggested to be of high quality by professional critics perform disproportionately strongly. This suggests 
that adult consumers of video games may be more discerning with regards to product quality than younger 
consumers, since the sales of titles rated for a general or teen audience do not seem to associate as strongly 
with stronger sales performance. There is also limited evidence of a significant interaction between sequels 
and the valence of both critics and users, although the effect is clearly not as strong. Although we would 
naturally expect to observe smaller coefficient estimates for these interaction terms, the combination of 
small and insignificant values is somewhat suggestive of diminishing returns to additional information and 
signals of product quality. Overall, we find some support for hypothesis H3 to the extent that only the 
interaction of specific combinations of signals (most notably between critic valence and age rating) explains 
significant variations in sales performance. 
 
These findings suggest that video game consumers generally make purchasing decisions based upon 
multiple reliable indicators of quality, such that disproportionately greater sales tend to be observed where 
a two or more credible signals are observed together. This is reinforced by observing that the individual 
coefficients for valence of user and professional critics are themselves statistically insignificant in these 
regressions; only the interaction of valence and other signals of quality appears to explain variation in sales 
performance. A further point to note is that the two information criteria (AIC and BIC) used to select the 
preferred model specification suggest some uncertainty with regards to interaction terms and whether their 
inclusion improves the modelling. The AIC suggests model V (with interaction terms) is the preferred 
specification, whereas the BIC suggests specification III (without interaction terms). However, the 
preferred model excluding interaction terms is the specification that includes both reviews from professional 
critics and consumer word-of-mouth, whereas the preferred specification including interaction terms 
features only interactions between reviews from professional critics and other observable signals of quality. 
It is therefore clear that it seems to be more important to capture interactions with reviews from 
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professional critics than any other variable. 
 
A possible concern over the results presented and discussed above relates to the potential for endogeneity 
between the variables of most significant interest; namely between sales performance and professional 
critical valence.  Following the theory of Eliashberg and Shugan (1997), it can be argued that reviews from 
professional critics simply predict rather than influence sales. If this is true, it is possible that any positive 
association observed between the two simply reflects correlation as opposed to causality. To respond to 
this concern, we also produce a series of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions to control 
for endogeneity using an instrument for the valence of professional critics. Although it is difficult to 
identify suitable instruments within our dataset, we propose the use of consumer valence as a possible 
candidate. In some respects, this is consistent with the modelling approach adopted by Chintagunta et al. 
(2010), who use reviews from professional critics as an instrument to control for endogeneity in their 
observed relationship between consumer word-of-mouth and commercial success. In the context of the 
results presented above and the estimated relationships between reviews from professional critics, users 
and sales performance in the market for video games, it seems appropriate to model the relationships in 
this way; indeed, consumer valence seems to meet all of the necessary criteria for inclusion as an 
instrumental variable. We have already seen that the coefficient estimates for consumer valence estimated 
in the OLS regressions become statistically insignificant once professional critic valence is separately 
controlled for. Additionally, we have demonstrated how consumer word-of-mouth is correlated with 
professional critic valence, but has less than half the strength of correlation with sales compared to 
professional critic reviews (see Table 2). A number of other authors have also noted the lack of strong, 
direct association between word-of-mouth valence and sales figures, including Liu (2006) and Duan et al. 
(2008), who both show that the majority of the explanatory power comes from the volume of online user 
reviews rather than the valence. An auxiliary regression confirms the strength of consumer word-of-mouth 
as an instrument for professional critic valence, with F statistics ranging between 35.80 and 71.04 
(depending on the inclusion/exclusion of the volume and consistency of reviews from professional critics); 
all well in excess of the recommended minimum value of 10. The evidence we have therefore suggests 
that user valence is likely to be a suitable instrument to control for the endogenous nature of the 
relationship between sales performance and reviews from professional critics. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Even after controlling for endogeneity between valence of professional critics and sales performance in 
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this way, our results remain relatively consistent compared with the OLS regression output. In model 
specification VIII, we see that in isolation, professional critic valence continues to demonstrate has a 
positive and significant influence upon sales performance. However, once other measures of response 
from professional critics and interactions with other signals are taken into account in specifications IX-
XI, this effect either diminishes or becomes indistinguishable from zero. These results therefore also 
reinforce the finding that the interaction between reviews from professional critics and a mature age rating 
is able to explain a significant amount of variation in sales performance. Other control variables show 
essentially identical relationships with sales as outlined previously, even after taking into account the 
endogeneity between the two key variables of interest. 
 
In summary, our empirical findings show partial support for our original research hypothesis H1. The 
predicted relationship with sales performance is observed strongly in the case of professional critics and 
although we find evidence that a strong association between sales and consumer valence in isolation, the 
effect disappears once reviews from professional critics and other signals of product quality are controlled 
for. We also find partial support for hypothesis H3, given that our regressions show significant interaction 
effects exist between certain key combinations of signals. Finally, we reject hypothesis H2 relating to the 
importance of interaction between reviews from professional critics and consumer word-of-mouth, 
finding no evidence to support the prediction that video game consumers attach a value to the presence 
of both of these signals simultaneously. 
 
Overall, this leads us to conclude that reviews from professional critics generally have a greater effect on 
buyer behavior than consumer word-of-mouth in the market for video games software. This is somewhat 
surprising given that the existing literature on word-of-mouth advertising consistently finds evidence of a 
significant influence upon sales, although in most cases such studies fail to simultaneously control for the 
influence of interaction with reviews from professional critics. However, we consider this finding to be 
entirely plausible given the timing of the availability of these signals, with reviews from professional critics 
typically being available to consumers some time in advance of the product release date, whereas word-
of-mouth exchange between consumers are essentially only possible post-release. This disparity, as well as 
results from our GMM estimations, leads us to conclude that professional critics do seem to have an 
influencing effect on sales that outweighs consumer word-of-mouth. However, our results also suggest 
that the interaction between professional critic valence and other externally observable signals of product 
quality associates significantly with sales performance; this is especially true for the interaction between 
professional critic valence and mature age ratings, as to some extent with sequels. The former finding in 
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particular suggests that the influencing effect of professional critics is even more pronounced for games 
intended for an adult audience compared with those titles aimed at a younger audience. This suggests that 
older video game consumers are somewhat more discerning in their choice of titles and that gamers 
generally are influenced by multiple signals of product quality when they make purchasing decisions. 
 
6. Concluding remarks and managerial implications 
 
This study aims to establish the extent to which reviews from professional critics and consumer word-of-
mouth affect sales performance in the market for video games. As well as exploring the effects of these 
two signals of product quality separately, we also estimate their relationship with sales jointly and through 
interactions between these and other signals of product quality. The findings of this study reinforce the 
hypothesis that the reviews of professional critics associate strongly with commercial success. After taking 
steps to control for endogeneity through the use of a GMM estimator, we find evidence that reviews from 
professional critics, in concert with other observable signals of product quality, influence sales as opposed 
to merely predicting them, suggesting that their independence and reputation serves as a credible signal 
that helps consumers to support the decision making process by minimizing uncertainty. We also find only 
limited evidence to suggest that the valence of consumer-word-of-mouth affects product sales once we 
control for reviews from professional critics and interaction terms. Consequently, our results are somewhat 
counterintuitive to a commonly held belief in the value of consumer word-of-mouth and emphasize the 
greater importance of reviews from professional critics in this particular market context.   
 
In terms of placing our study and our findings within the context of the extant literature, it is clear that 
our results reinforce some well-established findings, while presenting alternative and sometimes 
contradictory evidence on others. The only other prior study that has focused on the market for video 
games is by Zhu and Zhang (2010), who fail to control for the reviews from professional critics alongside 
their measure of consumer word-of-mouth and even explicitly mention the inclusion of such controls as 
a worthwhile extension of their work. Hence, our study is able to improve through the inclusion of a 
greater number of control variables compared with theirs. However, our findings contradict a number of 
similar studies undertaken on the movie industry. For example, the study by Moon et al. (2010) finds 
evidence of significant interaction between the valence of users and professional critics, whereas we find 
no such evidence in the market for video games. Perhaps this difference in findings relates to 
heterogeneous consumer behavior in the respective markets, with movie consumers appearing to place a 
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higher value on universal acclaim among both critics and users compared with the video games consumers, 
who seemingly attach a higher value on reviews from professional critics.   
 
We also arrive at contradictory results in comparison with Chintagunta et al. (2010), given that they 
highlight the importance of the valence of word-of-mouth and find no evidence for significant explanatory 
power of reviews from professional critics, nor the volume and valence of user reviews. We essentially 
arrive at the opposite conclusions, potentially as a consequence of our aggregation to the national level 
versus their regional-level analysis; an acknowledgment the authors themselves make in their paper. 
Instead, our findings are perhaps in most accordance with the recent study by Basuroy et al. (2014), who 
also highlight the importance of controlling for both reviews from critics and consumer word-of-mouth 
simultaneously. They find that the strength of relationship between sales and either form of review 
diminishes once the other is controlled for. However, our findings differ in the sense that they again find 
evidence of significant interaction between the two measures, whereas our findings suggest otherwise. 
Nonetheless, this recent study highlights an increasing awareness on the part of researchers into 
entertainment markets to properly control for both reviews from professional critics and consumer word-
of-mouth when attempting to model sales performance, as well as possible interactions between them and 
a range of other signals of product quality. 
 
From a managerial perspective, it is of vital importance to forecast product sales efficiently, in particular 
those of new products in the early stages of their life cycle. Thus, it is important to understand the range 
of relevant signals that influence the behaviour of customers and how the information contained in these 
signals can be measured and evaluated in order to optimize managerial decisions and strengthen 
competitive advantages. Our results also suggest that measures of valence from professional critics, such 
as Metacritic scores, are of vital importance to video games developers and publishers. We therefore also 
suggest that publishers should make increasing use of contracts with development studios whereby 
royalties are paid or received based on the critical response achieved by a given title, as this is shown to be 
a major factor in determining sales performance. This is a particularly important recommendation for titles 
designed for a mature audience, since it appears that the opinions of professional critics carry even more 
weight among this particular market segment and hence exert an even greater influence on commercial 
performance. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: US Video Games Market Development from 1995 to 2012 
 
 
Figure 2: Lorenz Curve of Consistency Measures 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Description  Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Unit Sales US unit sales ‘000s (Dependent Variable) 558.82 240.00 1091.11 10.00 13870.00 
Professional Critic Review Variables 
Critic Valence Weighted average review scores from professional critics listed on Metacritic 70.55 72.00 13.79 12.00 98.00 
Critic Volume Number of reviews from professional critics listed on Metacritic 38.38 36.00 20.25 2.00 107.00 
Critic Consistency Consistency of ratings from professional critics listed on Metacritic 0.65 0.59 0.17 0.34 1.00 
User Review Variables       
User Valence Weighted average review scores from users listed on Metacritic 73.11 76.00 13.27 13.00 98.00 
User Volume Number of reviews from users listed on Metacritic 94.38 25.00 292.69 4.00 4768.00 
User Consistency Consistency of ratings from users listed on Metacritic 0.69 0.65 0.21 0.33 1.00 
Signals of Quality 
Sequel Game is a sequel to an earlier title released in the same series 0.56 1.00 - 0 1 
Re-release Game is a re-release of a classic title 0.06 0.00 - 0 1 
Rating M Game has received an age appropriateness rating of ‘M’ (Mature) by the ESRB 0.18 0.00 - 0 1 
Launch Price Original sales price ($) on Amazon.com at time of release 36.11 29.99 15.94 4.77 79.79 
Game-Specific Control Variables 
Life Cycle Point during the product (hardware) lifecycle at which the game was released (years) 2.46 2.00 1.29 0.00 6.00 
Max Players Maximum number of players allowed by the game simultaneously 1.72 1.00 1.25 1 8 
Online Game features online connectivity 0.39 0.00 - 0 1 
Licensed Game is an officially licensed title 0.31 0.00 - 0 1 
Accessory Game comes packaged with a physical peripheral or accessory 0.01 0.00 - 0 1 
Multi-Platform Game is also available for other hardware platforms 0.52 1.00 - 0 1 
Gameplay Perspective Controls 
First-Person Game is played from a first-person perspective (Base) 0.26 0.00 - 0 1 
Platform Game is a platformer 0.08 0.00 - 0 1 
Isometric Game is played from an isometric perspective 0.05 0.00 - 0 1 
Side-Scrolling Game is played from a side-scrolling perspective 0.07 0.00 - 0 1 
Top-Down Game is played from a top-down perspective 0.10 0.00 - 0 1 
Third-Person Game is played from a third-person perspective 0.76 0.00 - 0 1 
Hardware Platform Controls 
NDS Game released for the Nintendo DS platform (Base) 0.18 0.00 - 0 1 
Wii Game released for the Wii platform 0.18 0.00 - 0 1 
PS3 Game released for the Playstation 3 platform 0.21 0.00 - 0 1 
PSP Game released for the Playstation Portable platform 0.14 0.00 - 0 1 
XBOX360 Game released for the Microsoft X-Box 360 platform 0.30 0.00 - 0 1 
Genre Controls 
Action Game is action genre (Base) 0.64 0.00 - 0 1 
Adventure Game is adventure genre 0.07 0.00 - 0 1 
Education Game is education genre 0.01 0.00 - 0 1 
Racing Game is racing genre 0.11 0.00 - 0 1 
RPG Game is role-playing game genre 0.14 0.00 - 0 1 
Simulation Game is simulation genre 0.11 0.00 - 0 1 
Sport Game is sport genre 0.19 0.00 - 0 1 
Strategy Game is strategy genre 0.12 0.00 - 0 1 
Major Publisher Controls 
2K Game is published by 2K Games 0.04 0.00 - 0 1 
Activision Game is published by Activision 0.08 0.00 - 0 1 
Atari Game is published by Atari 0.02 0.00 - 0 1 
Capcom Game is published by Capcom 0.03 0.00 - 0 1 
Disney Game is published by Disney 0.01 0.00 - 0 1 
Eidos Game is published by Eidos 0.02 0.00 - 0 1 
EA Game is published by EA 0.13 0.00 - 0 1 
Konami Game is published by Konami 0.03 0.00 - 0 1 
Microsoft Game is published by Microsoft 0.02 0.00 - 0 1 
Midway Game is published by Midway 0.02 0.00 - 0 1 
Namco Game is published by Namco 0.03 0.00 - 0 1 
Nintendo Game is published by Nintendo 0.07 0.00 - 0 1 
Rockstar Game is published by Rockstar 0.01 0.00 - 0 1 
Sony Game is published by Sony 0.06 0.00 - 0 1 
Sega Game is published by Sega 0.07 0.00 - 0 1 
THQ Game is published by THQ 0.06 0.00 - 0 1 
Square-Enix Game is published by Square-Enix 0.03 0.00 - 0 1 
Ubisoft Game is published by Ubisoft 0.08 0.00 - 0 1 
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Table 2: Correlation Coefficients 
 Critic Valence Critic Volume Critic Consistency User Valence User Volume User Consistency US Sales 
Critic Valence 1.00 0.53 0.49 0.63 0.33 0.11 0.33 
Critic Volume 0.53 1.00 0.29 0.27 0.48 -0.12 0.35 
Critic Consistency 0.49 0.29 1.00 0.22 0.35 0.12 0.32 
User Valence 0.63 0.27 0.22 1.00 0.10 0.35 0.13 
User Volume 0.33 0.48 0.35 0.10 1.00 -0.05 0.44 
User Consistency 0.11 -0.12 0.12 0.35 -0.05 1.00 -0.06 
US Sales 0.33 0.35 0.32 0.13 0.44 -0.06 1.00 
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Table 3: OLS Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable LN US Unit Sales 
Independent Variable I II III† IV V† VI VII 
Professional Critics        
Valence (Weighted Average Rating) 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
 0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.015** 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
Volume (No of Ratings) 0.018***  
(0.002) 
 0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Consistency (Sum of Squares of Pos-Neg-Neutral) 1.234*** 
(0.169) 
 1.030*** 
(.174) 
1.078*** 
(0.215) 
1.054*** 
(0.212) 
1.094*** 
(0.213) 
1.073*** 
(0.214) 
Word-of-Mouth        
Valence (Weighted Average Rating)  0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Volume (No of Ratings)  0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Consistency (Sum of Squares of Pos-Neg-Neutral)  -0.540*** 
(0.137) 
-0.516*** 
(0.131) 
-0.502*** 
(0.133) 
-0.495*** 
(0.132) 
-0.498*** 
(0.133) 
-0.492*** 
(0.132) 
Interaction Effects        
Prof Valence x User Valence    -0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.000) 
Prof Valence x Reputation Effects (Sequels)     0.009** 
(0.004) 
 0.008 
(0.005) 
Prof Valence x Reputation Effects (Re-Release)     -0.004 
(0.009) 
 -0.004 
(0.013) 
Prof Valence x Discrimination Effects (Rating M)     0.013*** 
(0.004) 
 0.018*** 
(0.005) 
User Valence x Reputation Effects (Sequels)      0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
User Valence x Reputation Effects (Re-Release)      -0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
User Valence x Discrimination Effects (Rating M)      0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Additional Signals        
Reputation Effects (Sequel) 0.224*** 
(0.053) 
0.276*** 
(0.056) 
0.209*** 
(0.052) 
0.209*** 
(0.052) 
0.215*** 
(0.052) 
0.205*** 
(0.052) 
0.215*** 
(0.052) 
Reputation Effects (Re-Release) 0.180  
(0.112) 
0.356*** 
(0.118) 
0.228** 
(0.111) 
0.228** 
(0.111) 
0.264** 
(0.116) 
0.241** 
(0.112) 
0.273** 
(0.112) 
Discrimination Effects (Rating M) 0.055  
(0.067) 
0.089 
(0.076) 
0.001 
(0.065) 
0.001 
(0.065) 
-0.002 
(0.064) 
-0.001 
(0.065) 
-0.008 
(0.064) 
LN Launch Price 0.282***  
(0.075) 
0.391*** 
(0.078) 
0.245*** 
(0.074) 
0.244*** 
(0.074) 
0.255*** 
(0.074) 
0.246*** 
(0.074) 
0.253*** 
(0.074) 
N 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 
F 29.200*** 16.700*** 29.610*** 29.530*** 31.620*** 28.550*** 30.630*** 
R2 0.494 0.443 0.520 0.520 0.526 0.522 0.527 
Highest VIF 4.090 3.940 4.130 4.170 5.410 5.180 6.90 
Average VIF 1.530 1.460 1.580 1.640 1.680 1.700 1.910 
AIC 3375.188 3499.742 3312.618 3314.387 3303.820 3315.326 3307.787 
BIC 3623.501 3748.056 3576.450 3583.393 3588.346 3599.851 3607.832 
Significance: 0.01 '***' 0.05 '**' 0.1 '*'.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. † Denotes the preferred model specifications according to the AIC/BIC criteria. 
The following represent additional control variables used in each of the above specifications (see Table 1 for details): Game-specific controls (Life cycle; Max players; Online; Licensed; 
Accessory; Multiplatform); Gameplay perspective controls (Platform; Isometric; Side-scrolling; Top-down; Third-person); Hardware platform controls (Wii; PSP; PS3; XBOX360); 
Genre controls (Adventure; Education; Racing; RPG; Simulation; Sport; Strategy); Major publisher controls (2K; Activision; Atari; Capcom; Disney; Eidos; EA; Konami; Microsoft; 
Midway; Namco; Nintendo; Rockstar; Sony; Sega; THQ; Square-Enix; Ubisoft) 
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Table 4: GMM Regression Results (Instrument: User Valence) 
 Dependent Variable LN US Unit Sales 
Independent Variable VIII IX X XI 
Professional Critics     
Valence (Weighted Average Rating) 0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Volume (No of Ratings) 
 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Consistency (Sum of Squares of Pos-Neg-Neutral) 
 
1.442*** 
(0.195) 
1.095*** 
(0.192) 
1.033*** 
(0.178) 
Word-of-Mouth 
    
Volume (No of Ratings) 
  
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Consistency (Sum of Squares of Pos-Neg-Neutral) 
  
-0.521*** 
(0.126) 
-0.516*** 
(0.125) 
Interaction Effects 
    
Prof Valence x Reputation Effects (Sequels) 
   
0.010** 
(0.005) 
Prof Valence x Reputation Effects (Re-Release) 
   
-0.003 
(0.009) 
Prof Valence x Discrimination Effects (Rating M) 
   
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
Additional Signals 
    
Reputation Effects (Sequel) 0.222*** 
(0.057) 
0.250*** 
(0.054) 
0.219*** 
(0.053) 
0.224*** 
(0.053) 
Reputation Effects (Re-Release) 0.223* 
(0.118) 
0.209* 
(0.108) 
0.237** 
(0.108) 
0.270** 
(0.113) 
Discrimination Effects (Rating M) 0.193*** 
(0.075) 
0.047 
(0.066) 
-0.001 
(0.064) 
-0.003 
(0.063) 
LN Launch Price 0.454*** 
(0.078) 
0.311*** 
(0.076) 
0.249*** 
(0.073) 
0.260*** 
(0.073) 
N 
1304 1304 1304 1304 
Wald Chi2 
748.80*** 1408.80*** 1526.10*** 1773.34*** 
R2 
0.426 0.489 0.519 0.525 
Significance: 0.01 '***' 0.05 '**' 0.1 '*'.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The following represent additional control variables used in each of the above specifications (see Table 1 for details): Game-specific controls (Life cycle; 
Max players; Online; Licensed; Accessory; Multiplatform); Gameplay perspective controls (Platform; Isometric; Side-scrolling; Top-down; Third-person); 
Hardware platform controls (Wii; PSP; PS3; XBOX360); Genre controls (Adventure; Education; Racing; RPG; Simulation; Sport; Strategy); Major 
publisher controls (2K; Activision; Atari; Capcom; Disney; Eidos; EA; Konami; Microsoft; Midway; Namco; Nintendo; Rockstar; Sony; Sega; THQ; 
Square-Enix; Ubisoft) 
 
